Currently there is a climate of high expectations within the international community with regard to producing demonstrable results of aid effectiveness in the health sector both at global and developing country level. Yet, measuring the results from aid effectiveness presents methodological challenges. Existing evaluation frameworks are not sufficiently geared toward whether and how practices have changed. This paper presents a framework for measuring results from implementing the aid effectiveness principles at three levels: implementation process, system strengthening, and outcomes/impact. We developed it in the context of the monitoring of the results from the aid effectiveness agenda in the health sector in Mali. Despite some changes in behavior resulting in increased aid effectiveness and improved results at system and impact level, these principles have not been fully implemented so far. Expectations in terms of health outcomes should thus be realistic.
Introduction
The effectiveness of development assistance to poor countries has been a major area of concern for both academics and practitioners over the past two decades, and it is likely to remain so as budgets from traditional donors are currently under severe fiscal strain.
Evaluations performed during the 1990's pointed out that the relative ineffectiveness of development aid was partly due to factors inherent in traditional aid modalities (namely standalone projects and structural adjustment programs), such as lack of coordination between donors, lack of coherence between donor-funded intervention and government operations, lack of capacity building and perverse effects over recipient administrations, and high transaction costs in managing aid funds. 1 Hence innovative aid modalities, such as sectorwide approaches (SWAp), have been introduced and implemented in order to respond to these weaknesses. In March 2005, the donor community led by the OECD's Development Assistance Committee and partner countries signed the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness and committed to respecting a number of principles presumed to increase aid effectiveness, such as ownership, alignment, harmonization, results-orientation and mutual accountability.
These commitments were reaffirmed in 2008 through the Accra Agenda for Action and in 2011 through the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation.
Concerns for aid effectiveness are particularly high in the health sector where aid inefficiencies are related to a number of cumulative reasons both at global and country level.
First, the global aid architecture in health is increasingly complex. [2] [3] [4] [5] Moreover, despite the dramatic increase in official development assistance for health over the past decade 5, 6 , those flows are disproportionally targeted to fighting HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases, while strengthening health systems and service delivery is clearly insufficiently funded. 4 Together with a number of political incentives, this creates a disconnection between aid flows and the 3 actual country needs in term of disease burdens. 3, [7] [8] [9] At country level, aid for health is very fragmented and aid effectiveness continues to be undermined by donor agencies' administrative habits and institutional incentives favoring inefficient practices. While recognizing that global constraints percolate down to country level, this paper focuses on operational constraints encountered at country level.
At country level, first attempts to improve donor coordination and aid effectiveness in the health sector were launched in the late 1990s in the form of program-based approaches (PBAs), better known at sectorial level as SWAps. 10 Since then, the concept of SWAp has evolved and many definitions have been proposed. 11 We define it as a way of working between a government and donors, who work together to gradually establish a comprehensive and coherent sector-wide policy and strategy -that is, a common approach for the entire sector. 12 SWAps are definitely not a rigid model, but a dynamic process. 13, 14 Existing evaluations conclude that results from health SWAps are mixed: they are generally good at process level, but they are more difficult to be demonstrated in terms of health impacts. 14, 15 For instance, a systematic review of the impact of PBA in the health sector in six countries undertaken by the World Bank's Independent Evaluation Group in 2009 showed that SWAps were largely successful in terms of coordination, oversight, harmonization and alignment of development assistance, but only modestly in terms of improved sector stewardship and achievement of national health objectives. 16 The success of a SWAp appears to depend on a number of institutional factors, notably stakeholders' commitments to tackle systemic issues and lead appropriate reforms so as to lift sector (and sometimes broader) constraints. 13, 14 SWAp principles have recently been reinvigorated by the launch in 2007 of the International Health Partnership and related initiatives (IHP+), which has become a major instrument at 4 global and country level for implementing the aid effectiveness principles in the health sector.
However, although major improvements in the way aid is delivered have been observed in recent years, significant progress is still needed to make health aid more effective. 9, 17 There is currently a climate of high expectations with regard to producing demonstrable results of aid effectiveness in the health sector, both at global and at developing country level.
Over the past few years, efforts have been made to better track health aid expenditure, and some attempts are made today to quantify health aid effectiveness. 5, 6, 9, 18 The Paris Declaration and IHP+ set forth a few objectives monitored by a limited number of process indicators reflecting better aid practices and better national systems, which in turn should produce better development results. In 2010, in consultations led by the World Health Organization (WHO), an operational framework was developed for the monitoring and evaluation of health system strengthening (HSS). It proposes the development of a single country platform for national monitoring and evaluation activities that can measure health system capacity as well as health system performance. 19 That framework has now been adopted by IHP+ for measuring progress in HSS.
Yet, we argue in this paper that the existing frameworks aimed at evaluating the results of aid effectiveness do not pay sufficient attention to the changes in behavior on the field, nor to ultimate development results. We thus propose to assess the results from the implementation of aid effectiveness principles at three levels: implementation process, HSS, and outcomes/impact.
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Methods
The three-level assessment framework below was developed in the context of the follow-up and stocktaking of the implementation of aid effectiveness principles in Mali performed by the authors since 2005. When starting to document the Malian SWAp experience, we were struck by the fact that while a lot of progress was made in formal terms (especially the inscription of all donor interventions within the national health plan, the participation of all significant stakeholders in the joint steering bodies, and improvements in joint programming tools), a number of behaviors were not changing. This is especially the case for donors maintaining projects targeted on specific health issues and/or geographic areas and sometimes managed through specific procedures, and donors continuing to organize bilateral missions and evaluations in addition to the joint ones.
That is why we decided to study more in-depth the implementation process of the initiatives 
Assessing the results from aid effectiveness
The agenda for aid effectiveness is presumed to improve results at different levels (macro-, meso-and micro-level) through a causal relationship: (i) improved aid delivery practices at the international level (as monitored against the Paris principles for instance); this, in turn, is 6 expected to lead to (ii) improved health systems and policies at the national level; which is also supposed to (iii) improve health service delivery at the operational level; and ultimately, (iv) impact health outcomes (e.g. immunization rates, use of health services, etc.) and health status (e.g. morbidity and mortality rates). The rationale underlying the Paris Declaration and IHP+ is often viewed simplistically as shown in Figure 1 .
Figure 1 comes here
The monitoring mechanism of the Paris Declaration and IHP+ implementation is limited to process measures at the macro level, but there is growing pressure to demonstrate that there are also results at the other end of the process -that is, in terms of health status. Yet, producing development outcomes and impact takes time and necessitates intermediary processes and effective behavior change that also takes time and cannot be expected to produce results in health status overnight. Actually, the seemingly simple causal arrows in the figure above mask not only a number of changes in behavior and practice of considerable importance, but also other contextual influences (political, social, economic) that impact on results. The rationale underlying the Paris Declaration should thus take account of the complexity involved in reforms to increase aid effectiveness and rather be viewed as in Figure   2 .
Figure 2 comes here
There are two important points to make here. Firstly, demonstrating that results are attributable to particular strategies from the agenda for aid effectiveness is tricky because from a methodological point of view, it is almost impossible to isolate the impact of such 7 strategies from other confounding factors, including those outside the health sector -e.g. the considerable socio-economic influence on health status. 20, 21 Indeed, aid delivery systems, public programs and health systems are all complex, often interlinking systems that cannot be studied experimentally. [22] [23] [24] Nevertheless comprehensive and contextualized research approaches can be used to gain useful insight into the impact of such strategies. [25] [26] [27] Secondly, effectively implementing the principles of aid effectiveness (beyond the few indicators of the Paris Declaration) necessarily encompasses many changes in behavior and practice on the part of both donors and recipient countries. If the principles are not fully implemented and the behaviors have not changed consequently (as was for instance the case in Zambia where little improvement in predictability of resources and donor alignment to country financial management systems were observed), 28 one cannot expect the (only partial) reform to produce results or impact on the subsequent levels of the system. Yet, when a reform (such as the Paris Declaration) is introduced, one rarely evaluates whether it has been implemented as it was conceived, nor whether it has produced the necessary behavior changes.
We argue in this paper that results from the agenda for aid effectiveness in the health sector can be measured at three levels. A first, critical step for evaluating the results from the Paris Declaration and other reforms such as IHP+ is to evaluate their implementation process as well as the direct effect it has had on changes in behavior for all stakeholders (donors, government, service providers, etc.). Such an evaluation allows not only verifying whether the agenda has been fully implemented, which is a result in itself, but also monitoring progress and increasing understanding of how and why outcomes can be improved. 23, 31, 32 For this second level, we recommend using an evaluation framework such as the one adopted by IHP+ mentioned above, that pays particular attention to the effects of donor interventions on HSS.
Finally, the third level where improvement is expected and should be measured is at health outcome/status level. As already mentioned, it is impossible to prove that observed changes in health outcomes and status are directly attributable to aid management reforms. Nevertheless, qualitative methods can help to understand which processes, and how far positive changes in health outcomes and status, can be attributed to improvements in aid delivery systems and HSS. i This part of the results chain is also correctly handled by the operational framework adopted by IHP+ which provides guidance as for bith the type of information and the monitoring and evaluation actions that should be taken. Victora and colleagues also propose a national platform approach to evaluation design to large-scale programs that may be very useful, notably to increase the ownership of evaluation by domestic constituencies and deepen the understanding of contributing factors. 24 
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The rest of this paper makes a synthesis of all the work the authors performed in Mali until the end of 2011 in view of taking stock of the experience of putting aid effectiveness principles into practice in the health sector. [33] [34] [35] [36] [37] Note however that recent political troubles in
Mali have led many donors to suspend their aid in March 2012, which unfortunately jeopardizes the progress reached during the past decade.
Application of the evaluation framework to the health sector in Mali
Mali is very dependent on official development assistance that accounted for close to 10% of gross domestic product and 30% of public expenditure in 2010. 38 The Government of Mali has been preoccupied by aid effectiveness since the 1990's, especially in the health sector. Compact, the policy processes are more inclusive than ever. More resources are managed at the decentralized level, which is particularly necessary to get results in such a huge country as
Mali. The MoH is also progressively strengthening its collaboration with the private sector. 36, 37 These changes in practice and behavior have undoubtedly enabled to reach some progress in terms of aid effectiveness. This is especially the case with regards to MoH leadership, MoH's financial department -which has been identified as a major factor impeding the implementation of planned activities. 36, 37 As a result, transaction costs (even if difficult to measure) 39 were not perceived by interviewed stakeholders as decreasing.
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Level 2 assessment: HSS
Even if HSS is a process that also requires behavioral changes at the operational level, and therefore takes time, we can say that improvements in aid effectiveness have produced positive results at the system level that are likely to improve health outcomes. The Malian health system has a pyramidal structure, based on the health-care district system. A consensual (Delphi) analysis of the Malian health system performed in 2007 shows that it can count on a great deal of strengths, but faces a number of weaknesses as well, especially in terms of human resource management, so that health care quality is quite low. 35 Turning to level 2 of the framework proposed above, one observes that the MoH capacities have been strengthened, notably those of the Planning Unit which has been reinforced by additional staff, trainings and material. Consequently, governance of the health sector has improved a lot since the launch of the SWAp, especially with regards to coordination, coherence and complementarity of interventions. Decentralization, service packages, as well as the quality of the programming, planning and budgeting processes have also improved a lot, leading to a more efficient use of resources. Some progress has been initiated in human resource management, with the issue in 2009 of a national plan for human resources for health 13 development. As for the other pillars of the health system, 2 coverage in terms of infrastructures significantly improved, particularly in initially disadvantaged regions; the availability of and access to essential medicines has improved; and the national health information system has been strengthened, notably thanks to support provided to the staff in charge of collecting statistics.
36,37
Level 3 assessment: outcomes/impact
Finally, turning to level 3 of the evaluation framework, recent evaluations show that improved donor coordination and efforts to support HSS have progressively improved the population's access to health services, their utilization and ultimately, health outcomes and status (including a reduction in regional disparities). 39 Indeed, the health sector in Mali has been performing well over the past decade as most indicators of outputs and outcomes have progressed. 40 According to WHO and UNICEF estimates, the maternal mortality ratio has 
Conclusion
We argue in this paper that although existing evaluation frameworks developed in the context of the Paris Declaration (early-process indicators) and IHP+ (HSS) are undoubtedly useful, they are not sufficient to evaluate the results achieved from the implementation of aid effectiveness principles at country level. Indeed, they do not pay enough attention to understanding whether and how behaviors have changed at donor, central and operational levels, and thus how reforms have actually been implemented. Yet, in reality, our case study of the health sector in Mali clearly shows that the commitments to aid effectiveness have only been partially implemented so far -thus there is a "two-speed implementation" of the aid effectiveness principles. And we have no reason to believe that it is very different in other sectors or countries facing a similar profile of aid dependence.
The agenda for aid effectiveness in the health sector has generated high expectations (especially in the very fragmented health sector), perhaps underestimating the extent and complexity of the reforms required, and therefore the time needed, for its implementation.
Thus in addition to political and other constraints at global level that cause health aid inefficiencies, even at country level, the aid effectiveness principles guide a long-term reform process. It is therefore unrealistic to expect a radical change to happen overnight On the contrary, monitoring more in-depth the "first level" of our evaluation framework is essential in order to discern the extent of the implementation of the agenda for aid effectivenessincluding what the constraining factors are and why, what reforms have led to improvements and why, and the impact on population health. However, as the recent high level forum in Busan emphasized, today nobody can be satisfied with progress made in aid effectiveness alone: development results must also be demonstrated. Even if it is extremely difficult to prove causal links between the three levels of our evaluation framework, our case study in Mali shows that using qualitative methods can be useful to identify the most plausible factors at the origin of results. i Note that some global health initiatives have extrapolated the number of lives saved from their interventions; transposed to aid effectiveness and HSS, a similar practice would mean extrapolating that if for example an 80% reduction in mortality rates can be attributed to HSS, and 75% of HSS can be attributed to aid, then 60% of lives saved are attributable to aid; this, however, is not credible from a scientific point of view.
ii Note that many of these strategies have been developed jointly with the support of donors -e.g. the national child survival strategy resulted from a UNICEF project in various pilot regions, and has since been scaled-up; the expanded programme on immunisation is also the result of collaboration between the MoH, WHO, UNICEF, GAVI and other partners. 
